The Whole is Less than the Sum of the Parts

[T]he music of the flute and of the lyre in most of their forms, are all in their general conception modes of imitation. … There is another art which imitates by means of language alone … The poet being an imitator, like a painter or any other artist, must of necessity imitate one of three objects: things as they were or are, things as they are said or thought to be, or things as they ought to be. [Aristotle, Poetics, Ch. i & xxv]

Aristotle’s idea that a literary work (as any other work of art), and by obvious extention language per se, is an imitation of the world out there has been profoundly influential in western literary theory. And yet, the latter part of that quote is a classic example of a self-deconstructing statement: things as they ought to be cannot be imitated because (by definition) things as they ought to be, as distinct from things as they are, are things which are not. In other words, things as they ought to be are always just things as as they are said to be.

Nevertheless, the things as they ought to be play a very significant role in Aristotle’s understanding of what makes good poetry. This is perhaps most visible in his discussion of characters:

In respect of character there are four things to be aimed at. First, and most important, it must be good. Now any speech or action that manifests moral purpose of any kind will be expressive of character: the character will be good if the purpose is good. This rule is relative to each class. Even a woman may be good, and also a slave; though the woman may be said to be an inferior being, and the slave quite worthless. The second thing to aim at is propriety. There is a type of manly valor; but valor in a woman, or unscrupulous cleverness is inappropriate. Thirdly, character must be true to life: for this is a distinct thing from goodness and propriety, as here described. … [Aristotle, Poetics, Ch. xv]

So, good characters (’good’ as worthy of a good author) are characters that at the same time serve good moral purpose, fit into social category of propriety and are true to life. The former two requirements are of the as ought to be type, while the latter is of the as is kind. But since a depiction cannot be at the same time of thing as it is and as it ought to be, such characters can never be created: in the conflict of the as is and as ought to be, is the author to create characters as people are, for example a woman that shows ‘manly’ kind of (inappropriate) valour, or is s/he to create them as they ought to be?

Aristotle’s answer to this question is clear: there is a moral imperative on the author to present characters as they ought to be. Speaking of the perfect tragedy, he says:

It follows plainly, in the first place, that the change of fortune presented must not be the spectacle of a virtuous man brought from prosperity to adversity: for this moves neither pity nor fear; it merely shocks us. Nor, again, that of a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity: for nothing can be more alien to the spirit of Tragedy; it possesses no single tragic quality; it neither satisfies the moral sense nor calls forth pity or fear. Nor, again, should the downfall of the utter villain be exhibited. A plot of this kind would, doubtless, satisfy the moral sense, but it would inspire neither pity nor fear; for pity is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man like ourselves. Such an event, therefore, will be neither pitiful nor terrible. [Aristotle, Poetics, Ch. xiii]

So if the author is to censor the world as it is and present instead a world as it ought to be, why still to speak of text as imitation? Because a text which does not imitate things, is one which, by necessity, creates things ex nihilo. Consequently, the moral imperative carried by a text which speaks of world as it ought to be cannot be shown to originate in anything other than the text itself; its claims cannot be tested against that which is, since it speaks of that which is not.

On the other hand, if there is a text that imitates things as they are it can claim necessity for that which it states, and hence authority. But can such a text carry a moral payload? It cannot; the moral imperative of a text requires that a text contains an evaluative ought to / ought not to, which must be absent from a text that is nothing but an imitation of the necessary reality out there.

What does it mean? It means that texts can have no absolute moral claims — potentially a text could contain a necessary (moral) truth, it just cannot be shown to be the case. As writers we want to affirm that there is a necessary connection between is and the ought to we put into our texts; yet that connection slips through our fingers ever time we try to capture it; therefore, the ought to must always be open to re-examination, just as the is is.

[If you are interested in this kind of stuff, you will find J. H. Miller’s The Ethics of Reading stimulating. The quotations of Poetics are from translation by S. H. Butcher.]